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Abstract
The expected utility hypothesis is one of the building blocks of classical economic theory and founded
on Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle. It has been put forward, e.g. by situations such as the Allais and
Ellsberg paradoxes, that real-life situations can violate Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle and hence also
expected utility. We analyze how this violation is connected to the presence of the ‘disjunction effect’ of
decision theory and use our earlier study of this effect in concept theory to put forward an explanation
of the violation of Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle, namely the presence of ‘quantum conceptual thought’
next to ‘classical logical thought’ within a double layer structure of human thought during the decision
process. Quantum conceptual thought can be modeled mathematically by the quantum mechanical
formalism, which we illustrate by modeling the Hawaii problem situation, a well-known example of the
disjunction effect, and we show how the dynamics in the Hawaii problem situation is generated by the
whole conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation.
1 Introduction
The mathematical modeling of expected utility in economics starts with the seminal work of John von
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern on economic behavior and games theory [24]. One of the basic principles
of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory is Savage’s ‘Sure-Thing Principle’ [22], which is equivalent to the
independence axiom of expected utility theory. Over the years, different modified versions of von Neuman-
Morgenstern’s original axiomatization of expected utility have emerged, while also its premisses have been
criticized by means of specific examples referred to as paradoxes. The Allais paradox [13] and the Ellsberg
paradox [17], for example, point to an inconsistency with the predictions of the expected utility hypothesis,
indicating a violation of the independence axiom and the Sure-Thing Principle. ‘Uncertainty aversion’ is
generally believed to be at the origin of this violation.
In recent works, we have analyzed aspects of human thought [3, 8] from the perspective of ongoing
investigations on concepts and how they combine, and an approach to use the quantum-mechanical for-
malism to model such combinations of concepts [7, 10, 11, 18]. In this way, we have shown [3, 8] that two
superposed layers can be distinguished in human thought: (i) a layer given form by an underlying classical
deterministic process, incorporating essentially logical thought and its indeterministic version modeled by
classical probability theory; (ii) a layer given form under the influence of the totality of the surrounding
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conceptual landscape, where different pieces of this conceptual landscape figure as individual entities rather
than as logical combinations of concepts, with measurable quantities such as ‘typicality’, ‘membership’,
‘representativeness’, ‘similarity’, ‘applicability’, ‘preference’ and also ‘utility’ carrying the influences. We
have called the process in this second layer ‘quantum-conceptual thought’ [3, 8], which is indeterministic
in essence, and contains holistic aspects, but is equally well organized as logical thought, although in a
very different manner. A substantial part of the ‘quantum-conceptual thought process’ can be modeled by
quantum-mechanical probabilistic and mathematical structures.
In the present article, we intend to apply the insights gained into the two-layered structure of human
thought, and the role played by the quantum formalism in modeling the decision processes involved in
what we have called the quantum-conceptual layer, to analyze the violation of the independence axiom
of expected utility theory. More specifically, we will look at the violation of the Sure-Thing Principle
connected to what psychologists call the disjunction effect [23] and how a quantum-mechanical model can
be proposed to describe this type of situation in mathematical terms. We will focus on a well known
example of the disjunction effect, the ‘Hawaii problem’ [23], and construct a quantum modeling for the
experimental data collected for a test of the Hawaii problem. We also analyze the connection with a
disjunction-type effect appearing for the ‘disjunction of concepts’, studied experimentally within concept
research [19], and illustrate how this analysis indicates that the whole conceptual landscape, hence not
only an effect of ambiguity aversion, plays a role in the deviations of classicality. We study experiments
with respect to the disjunction effect in the form of a modified Hawaii situation [14], and show how these
experiments also show a contextual influence of the whole conceptual landscape, and use the explanations
in our work on concept combinations [3, 8, 7, 10, 11, 1, 2] to shed light on the violation of the Sure-Thing
Principle. In [9] we use the approach in the present article to investigate the Ellsberg paradox and its
violation of the Sure-Thing Principle.
2 The Sure-Thing Principle and the disjunction effect
Savage introduced the Sure-Thing Principle [22] was inspired by the following story: A businessman con-
templates buying a certain piece of property. He considers the outcome of the next presidential election
relevant. So, to clarify the matter to himself, he asks whether he would buy if he knew that the Democratic
candidate were going to win, and decides that he would. Similarly, he considers whether he would buy if he
knew that the Republican candidate were going to win, and again finds that he would. Seeing that he would
buy in either event, he decides that he should buy, even though he does not know which event obtains, or
will obtain, as we would ordinarily say. The Sure-Thing Principle is equivalent to the independence axiom
of expected utility theory: ‘independence’ here means that if a person is indifferent in their choice between
simple lotteries L1 and L2, they will also be indifferent in choosing between L1 mixed with an arbitrary
simple lottery L3 with probability p and L2 mixed with L3 with the same probability p.
The above situation is similar to what in psychology is called the disjunction effect. A well-known
example of this disjunction effect is the so-called Hawaii problem [23], which is about the following two
situations.
Disjunctive version: Imagine that you have just taken a tough qualifying examination. It is the end of
the fall quarter, you feel tired and run-down, and you are not sure that you passed the exam. In case you
failed you have to take the exam again in a couple of months after the Christmas holidays. You now have
an opportunity to buy a very attractive 5-day Christmas vacation package to Hawaii at an exceptionally
low price. The special offer expires tomorrow, while the exam grade will not be available until the following
day. Would you: x buy the vacation package; y not buy the vacation package; z pay a $5 non-refundable
fee in order to retain the rights to buy the vacation package at the same exceptional price the day after
tomorrow after you find out whether or not you passed the exam?
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Pass/fail version: Imagine that you have just taken a tough qualifying examination. It is the end of
the fall quarter, you feel tired and run-down, and you find out that you passed the exam (failed the exam.
You will have to take it again in a couple of months after the Christmas holidays). You now have an
opportunity to buy a very attractive 5-day Christmas vacation package to Hawaii at an exceptionally low
price. The special offer expires tomorrow. Would you: x buy the vacation package; y not buy the vacation
package: z pay a $5 non-refundable fee in order to retain the rights to buy the vacation package at the
same exceptional price the day after tomorrow.
In the Hawaii problem, more than half of the subjects chose option x (buy the vacation package) if
they knew the outcome of the exam (54% in the pass condition and 57% in the fail condition), whereas
only 32% did so if they did not know the outcome of the exam.
This Hawaii problem demonstrates clearly a violation of the Sure-Thing Principle. Indeed, subjects
prefer option x (to buy the vacation package) when they know that they passed the exam and they also
prefer x when they know that they failed the exam, but they refuse x (or prefer z) when they don’t know
whether they passed or failed the exam. The Hawaii problem suggests that the origin of the violation of
the Sure-Thing Principle is ‘uncertainty aversion’. Indeed, subjects prefer to buy the vacation package in
both cases where they have certainty about the outcome of the exam, while they refuse to buy the package
when they do not yet know whether they passed or failed the exam and hence lack this certainty.
3 Quantum Modeling of the Hawaii disjunction effect
The disjunction effect in decision theory is an example of a situation that can be described in the general
quantum-modeling scheme that we elaborated in earlier work [1, 2, 3, 8, 7, 10, 11]. In the following, we
put forward an explicit example of such a quantum model. Let us denote by A the conceptual situation in
which the subject has passed the exam, and by B the conceptual situation in which the subject has failed
the exam. The disjunction of both conceptual situations, denoted ‘A or B’, is the conceptual situation
where the subject has passed or failed the exam. The subject needs to make a decision whether to buy the
vacation package (positive outcome) or not to buy it (negative outcome).
In working out our quantum-modeling of the disjunction effect, we use the notion of ‘state of a concept’
in the way it was introduced in [7, 10, 11] and represent the above conceptual situations by such states,
and hence by a unit vector in a complex Hilbert space, by analogy with how the state of a quantum entity
is represented in quantum mechanics. Hence we represent A by a unit vector |A〉 and B by a unit vector
|B〉 in a complex Hilbert space H, respectively. We take |A〉 and |B〉 orthogonal, hence 〈A|B〉 = 0, and
describe the disjunction ‘A or B’ by means of the normalized superposition state 1√
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(|A〉 + |B〉). The
decision to be made is ‘to buy the vacation package’ or ‘not to buy the vacation package’. This decision
is described in our quantum-modeling scheme by means of projection operator M of the Hilbert space H.
The probability for an outcome ‘yes’ (buy the package) in the ‘pass’ situation (state |A〉) is 0,54, and let
us denote this probability by µ(A) = 0, 54. The probability for an outcome ‘yes’ (buy the package) in
the ‘fail’ situation (state |B〉) is 0.57, i.e. in our notation µ(B) = 0.57. The probability for an outcome
‘yes’ (buy the package) in the ‘pass or fail’ situation (state 1√
2
(|A〉 + |B〉)) is 0.32, i.e. in our notation
µ(A or B) = 0.32.
In accordance with the quantum rules we have
µ(A) = 〈A|M |A〉 µ(B) = 〈B|M |B〉 µ(A or B) = 1
2
(〈A| + 〈B|)M(|A〉 + |B〉) (1)
Applying the linearity of Hilbert space and taking into account that 〈B|M |A〉∗ = 〈A|M |B〉, we have
µ(A or B) =
1
2
(〈A|M |A〉 + 〈A|M |B〉+ 〈B|M |A〉+ 〈B|M |B〉) (2)
3
=
µ(A) + µ(B)
2
+ ℜ〈A|M |B〉 (3)
where ℜ〈A|M |B〉 is the real part of the complex number 〈A|M |B〉, i.e. the interference term. Its presence
allows to produce a deviation from the average value 12(µ(A) + µ(B)), which would be the outcome in the
absence of interference. Note that we have applied two of the key quantum features, namely superposition,
in taking 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉) to represent ‘A or B’, and interference, as the effect appearing in equation (2).
This ‘quantum model based on superposition and interference’ can be realized in a three-dimensional
complex Hilbert space C3. For a more detailed analysis we refer to [1, 2, 3]. Here we focus on the C3
realization for the Hawaii problem. We remark that, for a given µ(A) and µ(B), the situation is always
such that µ(A) + µ(B) is smaller than or equal to 1 or is greater than 1. Let us now construct explicitly
the C3 model. In case (i) µ(A) + µ(B) ≤ 1, we put a = 1− µ(A), b = 1− µ(B) and γ = pi, and in case (ii)
1 < µ(A) + µ(B), we put a = µ(A), b = µ(B) and γ = 0. We choose
|A〉 = (√a, 0,√1− a) (4)
|B〉 = ei(β+γ)(
√
(1− a)(1− b)
a
,
√
a+ b− 1
a
,−
√
1− b)
if a 6= 0; |B〉 = eiβ(0, 1, 0) if a = 0 (5)
β = arccos(
2µ(A or B)− µ(A)− µ(B)
2
√
(1− a)(1 − b) )
if a 6= 1, b 6= 1; β is arbitrary if a = 1 or b = 1 (6)
We take M(C3) the ray spanned by the vector (0, 0, 1) in case µ(A) + µ(B) ≤ 1, and we take M(C3) the
subspace of C3 spanned by vectors (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0) in case 1 < µ(A) + µ(B). This gives rise to a
quantum-mechanical description of the situation with probability weights µ(A), µ(B) and µ(A or B). Let
us verify this. We have that both vectors |A〉 and |B〉 are unit vectors, since 〈A|A〉 = a + 1 − a = 1 and
either 〈B|B〉 = (1−a)(1−b)
a
+ a+b−1
a
+ 1− b = 1 in case a 6= 0 or 〈B|B〉 = 1 trivially in case a = 0. For both
cases of a, one can easily check that 〈A|B〉 = 0, e.g. 〈A|B〉 =
√
(1− a)(1− b)eiβ −
√
(1− a)(1 − b)eiβ = 0
for a 6= 0, which shows that |A〉 and |B〉 are orthogonal. Now we only need to check whether this model
yields the correct probabilities in the expressions (1).
First, let us consider a 6= 0, a 6= 1, b 6= 1. In case that µ(A)+µ(B) ≤ 1, we have 〈A|M |A〉 = 1−a = µ(A),
〈B|M |B〉 = 1 − b = µ(B), and 〈A|M |B〉 = −√(1− a)(1− b)eiβ+γ = √(1− a)(1− b)eiβ . In case
1 < µ(A) + µ(B), we have 〈A|M |A〉 = a = µ(A), 〈B|M |B〉 = (1−a)(1−b)
a
+ a+b−1
a
= ab
a
= b = µ(B),
and 〈A|M |B〉 = √a
√
(1−a)(1−b)
a
eiβ =
√
(1− a)(1 − b)eiβ . Hence in both cases we have ℜ〈A|M |B〉 =√
(1− a)(1 − b) cos β, so that ℜ〈A|M |B〉 = 12(2µ(A or B) − µ(A) − µ(B)). Applying (6) this gives
µ(A or B) = 12(µ(A) + µ(B)) + ℜ〈A|M |B〉, which corresponds to (2). This shows that, given the val-
ues of µ(A) and µ(B), the correct value for µ(A or B) is obtained in this quantum-model representation.
We note that for ‘extreme’ values of a, b, this model in general does not yield correct values for the
disjunction. First, let us note that the case a = 0 only occurs when µ(A) = 1 and µ(B) = 0 and hence
M(C3) is the ray spanned by (0, 0, 1) and b = 1. So |A〉 = (0, 0, 1) and |B〉 = eiβ(0, 1, 0), with β arbitrary.
It is easy to check that 〈A|M |A〉 = 1 = µ(A), 〈B|M |B〉 = 0 = µ(B). We have 〈A|M |B〉 = 0, and there
is no interference. In such a case, the model is only valid if µ(A or B) = 12(µ(A) + µ(B)) =
1
2 . Secondly,
let a 6= 0. The case b = 1 can also occur for µ(B) = 1 and M(C3) is then the plane spanned by (1, 0, 0)
and (0, 1, 0). It is easy to check that 〈A|M |A〉 = a = µ(A), 〈B|M |B〉 = 1 = µ(B). Also, 〈A|M |B〉 = 0,
and again there is no interference. Finally, let a = 1. Then |A〉 = (1, 0, 0) and |B〉 = eiβ(0,√b,−√1− b),
with β arbitrary. The outcome of similar calculations is again that there is no interference. In other words,
as soon as µ(A) ∈ {0, 1} or µ(B) ∈ {0, 1}, the interference term in this model vanishes and it only yields
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the correct numerical value if µ(A or B) = 12(µ(A) + µ(B)). For these ‘extreme’ cases, one needs to adopt
a slightly more elaborate model, as presented in [3]. In fact, depending on the values of µ(A), µ(B) and
µ(A or B), the equation (6) determines whether it is possible to construct a representation of the data in
a C3 model or not. Nevertheless, for many situations encountered in ‘real-life’ economic paradoxes like the
Hawaii problem, the probabilities µ(A), µ(B) and µ(A or B) take ‘non-extreme’ values such that the C3
model suffices.
In this C3 model, only eiβ appears as ‘not a real number’ in the vector |B〉. For two values of β, namely
β = 0◦ and β = 180◦, eiβ is a real number, which means that for these two values of β we can make a
graphical representation of the situation in R3. The interference effect is present for these two values of
β but can take only two values. The role of the complex numbers is to allow it to obtain any value in
between these two values. In [3] the vectors |A〉 and |B〉 and the angle β for a number of experimental
data in concept theory have been calculated. For some of the items no C3 model exists and one needs to
extend the modeling to Fock space [2]. However, for the specific case of the Hawaii problem a quantum
representation by means of the C3 model is possible. Indeed, we have µ(A) = 0.54, µ(B) = 0.57 and
µ(A or B) = 0.32. First, let us note that this means that this situation does not allow a classical model,
since µ(A or B) < µ(B). Secondly, let us construct the C3 quantum model for this situation. We have
1 < µ(A) + µ(B) = 1.11, and hence we put a = 0.54, b = 0.57 and γ = 0. After making the calculations
of equations (4), (5) and (6), we obtain |A〉 = (0.7348, 0, 0.6782), |B〉 = ei121.8967◦ (0.6052, 0.4513,−0.6557)
and we take M(C3) the subspace of C3 spanned by vectors (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). It is easy to verify that
this model indeed yields the correct numerical outcomes.
4 Concept Combinations, the disjunction effect and conceptual land-
scapes
The disjunction effect has most of all been studied within the research domain of ‘decision theory’. Quantum
game theory has been used to model it [15, 21], and also quantum theoretical models have been worked out
for it [16, 20, 25] along similar lines as the models we worked out [1, 2, 3, 4] and of which we presented a short
presentation in the foregoing section. In different terms, however, the effect was studied experimentally in
connection with problems occurring with the combination of concepts [19]. Let us show by an example what
we mean. Consider the concepts Home Furnishings and Furniture and their disjunction Home Furnishings
or Furniture and the item Ashtray. Subjects estimated the membership weight of Ashtray for the concept
Home Furnishings to be 0.3 and the membership weight of the item Ashtray for the concept Furniture to
be 0.7. However, the membership weight of Ashtray with respect to the disjunction Home Furnishings or
Furniture was estimated only 0.25, less than both weights with respect to both concepts apart [19]. This
deviation from a standard classical interpretation of the disjunction was called ‘underextension’ [19]. We
can easily see the correspondence with the original situation of the disjunction effect, for example the Hawaii
problem. What is particularly interesting, however, is that although the item Ashtray shows underextension
with respect to the disjunction of the concepts Home Furnishings and Furniture, the study of concepts
and their disjunction shows that on many occasions the inverse effect occurs as well. For example, with
respect to the pair of concepts Fruits and Vegetables and their disjunction Fruits or Vegetables, for the
item Olive the membership weights with respect to Fruits, Vegetables and Fruits or Vegetables were 0.5,
0.1 and 0.8, respectively. This ‘inverse disjunction effect’ has been called ‘overextension’ [19]. We can
prove that for these weights it is not possible to find a Kolmogorovian representation [3]. This means that
these weights cannot be obtained by supposing that subjects reasoned following classical logic and that
the weights are the result of a lack of knowledge about the exact outcomes given by each of the individual
subjects. Indeed, if 50% of the subjects have classified the item Olive as belonging to Fruits, and 10%
have classified it as belonging to Vegetables, then following classical reasoning at most 60% of the subjects
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(corresponding with the set-theoretic union of two mutually distinct sets of subjects) can classify it as
belonging to ‘Fruits or Vegetables’, while the experiment shows that 80% did so. This means that these
weights arise in a distinct way. Some individual subjects must necessarily have chosen Olive as a member of
‘Fruits or Vegetables and ‘not as a member’ of Fruits and also ‘not as a member’ of Vegetables, otherwise the
weights 0.5, 0.1 and 0.8 would be impossible results. It is here that the previously referred to second layer
of thought — quantum-conceptual thought — comes into play. Concretely, this means that for the item
Olive, the subject, rather than reasoning in a logical way, directly wonders whether Olive is a member or
not a member of ‘Fruits or Vegetables’. In this quantum-conceptual thought process, the subject considers
‘Fruits or Vegetables’ as a newly emerging concept and not as a classical logical disjunction of the two
concepts Fruits and Vegetables apart. As a result, the subject’s choice is influenced in favor or against
membership of Olive with respect to Fruits or Vegetables by the presence of the new concept ‘Fruits or
Vegetables’. This is why we say that within the quantum-conceptual thought process it is the emergence
of a new concept, i.e. the concept ‘Fruits or Vegetables’, within the landscape of existing concepts, i.e.
Fruits, Vegetables and Olive, that gives rise to the deviation from the membership weight that would be
expected following classical logic. And it is the probability of deciding for or against membership that is
influenced by the presence of this new concept within the landscape of existing concepts. Concretely, in
this case, the subject estimates whether Olive is characteristic of the new concept ‘Fruits or Vegetables’,
evaluating whether Olive is one of those items that raise doubts as to whether it is a Fruit or a Vegetable.
And since for Olive this is typically the case, its weight with respect to ‘Fruits or Vegetables’ is relatively
big, namely 0.8, compared to the weights 0.5 and 0.1 with respect to the individual concepts Fruits and
Vegetables, respectively. Most importantly, it is ‘bigger than the sum of both’ (0.8 is strictly bigger than 0.5
+ 0.1), which makes a classical logical and stochastic probabilistic explanation impossible, as we explicitly
proved in earlier work [3]. As a consequence of this finding — that the weights for the item Olive with
respect to the pair of concepts Fruits, Vegetables and ‘Fruits or Vegetables’ cannot be modeled within a
Kolmogorovian probability structure — there cannot exist an underlying deterministic process giving rise
to these weights. This means that the conceptual thought process that takes place when a subject decides
‘for’ or ‘against’ membership of the item Olive with respect to the concepts Fruits, Vegetables and Fruits
or Vegetables intrinsically does not follow the rules of classical logic. We have shown that the conceptual
thought process resulting in the weights with respect to the different conceptual structures, when different
possible decisions are considered, can be modeled by means of a quantum-mechanical probability structure
[3].
Is it possible to apply the above explanation for deviations from classical logical thought, i.e. the
presence of quantum-conceptual thought, to the disjunction of concepts with respect to the traditional
disjunction effect, for example the Hawaii problem, so as to understand the violation of the Sure-Thing
Principle? There is a set of experiments [14], although performed with a different goal from ours, which
confirm that our explanation for concepts and their disjunction is also valid for the traditional disjunction
effect. The experiments consider the Hawaii problem to show that the disjunction effect does not depend
on the presence of uncertainty (pass or fail the exam) but on the introduction into the text-problem of
a non-relevant goal [14]. This indicates in a very explicit way that it is the overall conceptual landscape
that gives form to the disjunction effect. More specifically, the authors point out that option z (‘pay a $5
non-refundable fee in order to retain the rights to buy the vacation package at the same exceptional price
the day after tomorrow after you find out whether or not you passed the exam’) contains an unnecessary
goal, i.e. that one needs to ‘pay to know’, which is independent of the uncertainty condition. In this sense,
their hypothesis is that the choice of option z occurs as a consequence of the construction of the discourse
problem itself [14]. Four experiments were performed in which various modifications with respect to option
z were considered, ranging from (1) eliminating from the text and option z any connection between the
‘knowledge of the outcome’ and the ‘decision’; (2) eliminating option z, limiting the decision to x (‘buy’) or
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y (‘not buy’); (3) making option z more attractive; (4) render the procrastination option z more onerous.
The experimental results support the view that the disjunction effect does not depend on the uncertainty
condition itself, but on the insertion of the misleading goal — ‘paying to know’ — into the text-problem.
When it is eliminated (but maintaining the uncertainty condition), the disjunction effect vanishes (exps.
1 and 2). Also, if choosing z makes sense (exp. 3), most subjects choose it. If option z is onerous (exp.
4), it is substantially ignored. In this sense, option z is not a real alternative to x and y, but becomes
an additional premise that conveys information which changes the decisional conceptual landscape. Hence
the crucial factor is the relevance of the discourse problem of which z is one element, rather than certainty
versus uncertainty. These results support the view that the disjunction effect appears when a suitable
decisional conceptual landscape is present rather than mainly depending on the presence of uncertainty.
If the specific conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation is what lies at the origin of the
disjunction effect, then this shows that what we have called ‘quantum-conceptual thought’ is taking place
during the process that gives rise to the disjunction effect. Following these experimental results, one can
argue that ‘the specific conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation’ plays a principal role in
shaping the disjunction effect.
To illustrate the above explanation directly for the case of the Hawaii problem, let us suppose that the
Hawaii dilemma is not about buying or not buying a vacation package but about saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to
a free Sauna and Jacuzzi relaxation weekend. In this case, the outcome may well be the opposite, with
a larger than expected number of subjects saying ‘yes’, particularly in the situation in which they do not
know their exam results, because their state of anxiety may in fact make the prospect of a relaxation
weekend more attractive than in the other two situations, in which they do know the results, whether pass
or fail. This would be an example of the inverse disjunction effect or overextension of the disjunction. We
indeed believe that in the traditional Hawaii situation, the disjunction effect, hence the underextension,
is due to the fact that the idea of making a trip is appealing only if the outcome of the exam is known,
whether pass or fail, whereas a free relaxation weekend is much more likely to be appealing even if the exam
results have not been released yet. We have conducted ourselves experiments with the aim of detecting
different pieces of the overall conceptual landscape determining the nature of the disjunction effect in the
case of the Ellsberg paradox [9], illustrating the above expressed view.
5 Conclusion
At this stage we should point out the following. In our earlier work [3, 8] we introduced the notion of
‘conceptual landscape’. One of the reasons for this is that our approach is grounded in a modeling of
concepts and their combinations [7, 10, 11, 18]. Of course, sometimes a human decision will be made
under the influence of a surrounding that cannot easily be expressed as a conceptual landscape. When we
pointed out explicitly that it is ‘the whole’ conceptual landscape which needs to be taken into account and
modeled within our quantum modeling scheme, we could have expressed this in a more complete way by
using the notion of ‘worldview’ as understood and analyzed in detail in the Leo Apostel Center [5, 6, 12].
These are all possible elements of a worldview surrounding a given situation that can influence a human
decision being made in this situation. Of course, if the elements of the surrounding worldview considered
can be expressed conceptually, i.e. if they are of the form of a conceptual landscape, then these elements
can be taken into account by means of the quantum modeling scheme we have developed in earlier work
for concepts and their combinations [1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 11, 18]. This being the case, we are already able to
grasp an enormously important and also substantial part of the dynamics generated by the totality of the
worldview influence, which is the reason why we have focused on this in our previous work.
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